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This thesis analyzes the aircraft carrier based Tactical
Support Center (CV-TSC) installation design from a human
factors viewpoint. Starting with the threat, the mission
of the CV-TSC is defined. A modular concept between man
and machine is developed. Man's role, tasks, and functions
are identified and form the basis for recommended changes
to the CV-TSC aboard the USS Constellation (CV-64) and
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1. The Threat and How the United States Meets It
The Soviet war machine has always run on the premise
of "defense of the homeland." Being a very large country,
with thousands of miles of borders which are easy entry ways
for invading forces, the Soviet army has been the main line
of defense. With the invention of the submarine, the Soviet
first line of defense became the diesel electric submarine.
Forced to operate close to its home port because of its
limited range, its mission was to sink the enemy threat
before they could land on the "homeland" itself, with the
Soviet army standing by to destroy those that did make it
through the submarine line of defense. [7 , 8.7
With the Soviets facing the threat of the United
States strike attack aircraft carriers (CVA) , this mission
to sink the enemy became even more imperative. However,
hampered by the short ranges of diesel electric submarines,
carriers could launch their attack outside the range of the
Russian submarine force.
With the invention of nuclear powered submarines
the capabilities and mission of the Soviet submarine force
8

changed drastically. Two basic missions emerged from this
vast increase in endurance and speed for the submarine.
The first mission was that of the ballistic missile
carrying submarine, with the missile pretargeted for desig-
nated areas in the United States and her allies. With the
limitation of targeting procedures for these missiles, they
were of no threat to operational forces at sea, but could
only be targeted for stationary known positions.
The second mission, which had always concerned the
Soviets, was stopping the invading enemy. The nuclear
powered submarine posed a much more awesome threat than the
diesel electric submarine. With its virtually unlimited
range, the nuclear submarine could now leave its home waters
and attack the enemy at a much greater range and, preferably,
long before the enemy was within striking distance of the
homeland. /8, 177
The United States Navy was now faced with an ocean-
wide threat to its CVA's from the Soviet submarine force.
However; this threat could still easily be met because of
the limitation on submarine armament, the torpedo.
Due to limited ranges of torpedoes, the submarine
was still forced to come in very close to the target before
launching its torpedoes. Merely screening the CVA with
sonar equipped destroyers made the submarine susceptible

to detection and attack. The destroyers could easily handle
the submarine threat and the difference between nuclear and
diesel electric powered submarines was almost negligible.
In the 60' s the development of a missile launched
by a submarine dramatically extended its attack range. To
insure the CVA's safety, the U.S. was forced to "sanitize"
a greatly expanded circle around the carrier, keeping it
clear of Soviet submarines. This circle has grown so large
that sonar equipped destroyers are unable to "sanitize" the
area and are themselves vulnerable to the submarines 1 launched
missile attack.
The United States needed a platform capable of oper-
ating not only at close-in ranges, as the sonar equipped
destroyers had done, but also at long ranges so as to be
able to counter the Soviet threat as the range of their
missiles grew progressively longer.
Even though the enemy threat had grown, the carrier's
ability to defend itself was limited. To carry out its
mission, it required certain numbers of aircraft, with pre-
scribed capabilities in regards to armament and mission
capability. Due to the physical limitation imposed by avail-
able deck space on a carrier, there was little if any space
available for ASW aircraft. However, with the development
of the F-14 aircraft, fewer of them were required for the
10

same fire power as the F-4's they were replacing. Thus,
somewhat alleviating the critical deck space limitation that
is inherent in an aircraft carrier, room was made on board
for several aircraft dedicated to ASW.
The S-3 aircraft was designed to fill the need for
ASW dedicated aircraft to carry out the mission against the
threat. It is a high speed, jet powered aircraft with a
long on-station time and is capable of detecting, classifying,
attacking, and destroying enemy submarines without any out-
side assistance. Due to the high data rate of modern ASW,
the S-3 is only able to accomplish its goal with the use of
an on-board, automated digital system. Outside assistance
however, may be a valuable asset and can be well utilized
by the S-3. [6]
B. THE CV-TSC
The CV-TSC was designed in response to the latest genera-
tion of ASW weapons system, such as the S-3, which require
computer handling of a high data rate system. With the
advent of high data rate requirements, ASCAC facilities were
obsolete and the CV-TSC fills this void.
1. Definitions
Reference 12 defines the following as they are
treated in this thesis.
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"Mission : A statement of what the system is to do
to solve a given problem and when and where .
Requirement : A statement of an obligation the system
must fulfill to effect the system mission. (ie. further de-
lineation of the mission.)
Function : A general means or action by which the
system fulfills its requirements. They are the first hows
of the system."
2. CV-TSC Mission
Reference 2 states the mission of the CV-TSC as
follows. "The CV-TSC 's mission is to provide preflight,
inflight, and postflight ASW support to the task force
commander and the ASW airborne platforms assigned to the
task force."
The task force commander's needs are (1) Plans to
accomplish tactical mission objective, (2) Information con-
cerning the present situation, (3) History of prior
activities, (4) Postflight analysis, flj
3. Requirements
To fulfill the role placed on it, the CV-TSC must be
able to interface with other high speed data rate digital
equipment, and to also communicate with personnel both on
the CV and those off the CV such as flight crews. The CV-TSC
12

must also be able to rapidly process acoustic data both in
real time and faster than real time for recorded events.
4. CV-TSC Functions and Tasks
The formulative idea behind the CV-TSC is that we
must use "computers" to handle the large amounts of sophisti-
cated data in a timely manner so as to be able to meet the
threat on a continually effective basis.
Reference 2 delineates the three basic functions of
the CV-TSC with relation to ASW airborne platforms.
a. Preflight Tasks
In order to perform the preflight function, (ie.
mission planning) the CV-TSC personnel must accomplish the
following tasks:
1. Normal Administrative Procedures - equipment
activated and functioning properly and personnel available
to operate the equipment.
2. Data Gathering - CV-TSC personnel must gather
data from many areas of the CV (Navigation, Operations, Flight
Operation, Intelligence, Air Wing Commander, etc.) and change
this raw data into a format the digital equipment can work
with. Then it must organize its information into a concise
and clear form the aircrew can work with.
3. Lines of Communication - actions and pro-
cedures required of CV-TSC personnel to transmit the data to
13

the flight crew and to the computer cassettes onboard the
S-3 aircraft.
b. Inflight Tasks
Inflight operations are the most complex area
assigned to the CV-TSC because information must be cleared
through the appropriate chain of command before it can be
disseminated to the airborne flight crew and aircraft.
1. Normal Administrative Procedures - equipment
activated and functioning properly and personnel available
to operate the equipment.
2. Lines of Communication - messages must flow
promptly and accurately either to or from higher authority,
ASW platforms, and other support ASW assets.
3. Evaluation - tactical data from all sources
such as NTDS, JEZEBEL/DIFAR, etc. must be analyzed and com-
pared to intelligence information in order to reach decisions
based on tactical information.
4. Command and Control - recommendations which
result from decisions based on evaluation are then forwarded
to ASW assets and or tactical commander.
c. Postflight Tasks
Postflight functions include debriefing the air-
crew, and collecting the Data Insertion Tape (cassette) for




The following tasks are included in postflight
functions
:
1. Normal Administrative Procedures - equipment
activated and functioning properly and personnel available
to operate the equipment.
2. Lines of Communication - information flow
between aircrew and TSC personnel, cassette and TSC personnel.
3. Debrief - actions required of TSC personnel to
obtain pertinent information from aircrew personnel concerning
events that happened during their mission.
4. Evaluation - cassette played back and grams
and mission events analyzed by TSC personnel.
5. Transmit - actions required to forward




Although the purpose of this study is to analyze the
mission of the TSC and to establish a recommended installa-
tion pattern for the TSC watch space, in order to facilitate
the timely completion of the mission, a description of the
system is made to convey an idea of the system layout and
the way it functions.
Some assumptions have been made to facilitate the study.
Although the system is capable of supporting S-3 aircraft,
and helicopters, and can coordinate with P-3 aircraft, this
study was limited to S-3 aircraft and helicopters. P-3 air-
craft are seldom available and many parts of the ocean are
not accessible to the land-based aircraft.
The basic assumption was that, even though other studies
indicate a need for change in the present equipment, £l3_7
until changes in equipment are brought about, we must manipu-
late our current equipment to our best advantage. In order to
facilitate the most efficient operation with current equipment,
we must discover the most workable layout for the equipment




All descriptions of functions performed at each station
will be describing only those functions normally performed
at those stations. Emergency war-time situations may cause
stations to be used in a manner for which they were not
designed and such descriptions are not included in this
study. A detailed physical description is not given but
may be obtained from Ref. 13.
1. Tactical Coordinator Station (I)
a. Equipment
(1) Tactical Coordinator Console
Plate (1) Tacco Console, Station l
b. Lines of Communication
(1) Interior
(a) Audio Switching Matrix (ASM) provides
communication between areas of TSC and associated areas of





(a) Secure and uncovered radio circuits
identical to Station III.
c . Tasks
(1) All aspects of Preflight, Inflight, and
Postflight operations are included here with the exception
of debrief in the Postflight phase.
2. Tactical Coordinator Station (II)
a. Equipment
(1) Tactical Coordinator Console
Plate (2) Tacco Console, Station II
b. Lines of Communication
(1) Interior
(a) ASM and verbal communications identical
to Station I. MC system with communications to TSWO, CICO,
ASAC, SURF OFF, TACO I, IC-2, STR, ADP, RAD REC 1, RAD REC 2,





(a) Secure and uncovered radio circuits
identical to Station III.
c. Tasks
(1) All aspects of Pref light, Inflight, and
Postflight operations are included here with the exception
of debrief in the Postflight phase.
3. Watch Officer Station (III)
a. Equipment
(1) Watch Officer Console
Plate (3) Watch Officer's Console,
Station III
b. Lines of 'Communication
(1) Interior
(a) ASM and verbal communication identical
to Station I. MC system with communication to Flag Officer
Control Station, Pilot House, Pri-Fly, Fac Black, Central
Control, Sec Conn, CICO, FICO, SURF OPS, CAPT-PILOT, SIG STA
SUPV, ENG OPS, Lookout, CATCC, D & D, AIR WAR, SURF, EW, CICO,
OPS OFF, CVIC, ASAC, TACCO I, TACCO II, IC-2, STR, ADP,
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RAD REC 2, RAD REC 3, RAD REC 4, RAD XMT 1, RAD XMT 2, RAD
XMT 3, and RAD XMT 4.
(2) Exterior
(a) Secure radio circuits as follows: Task
Group Tactical, Fleet Tactical Warning, PIRAZ, Strike, SAU A,
SAU B, SAU C, SSSC, SNIP, and NAVY RED.
(b) Uncovered radio circuits are as follows
:
Task Group Tactical, Fleet Tactical Warning, OTC SUB OPS,
Beaver, SAU A, SAU B, SAU C, ASW AIR, SSSC, AND SAR Commander.
c. Tasks
(1) All aspects of Preflight, Inflight, and
Postflight operations are included here with the exception
of debriefing during Postflight.
4. Brief/Debrief Station (IV and V)
a. Equipment
(1) Brief/Debrief Console
(2) Television Projector -
(3) Hard Copy Printer




Plate (5) Hard Copy Printer
b. Lines of Communication
(1) With the exception of the hard copy printer,
the above equipment is located in ready rooms so that the only
line of communication is by shipboard telephone to other
spaces. The hard copy printer is located in the TSC watch
space so the hard copy of the briefing must be hand carried
from the TSC watch space to the briefing room.
c. Tasks
(1) To carry out communication between CV-TSC
personnel and aircrews during Preflight phase, and debriefing
during Postflight phase.
5 . Automatic Data Processor (VI)
a . Equipment
1. ADP Console, Recorder/Reproducer Magnetic
Disk, S-3 Magnetic Tape Cabinet, High Speed Line Printer,
Computer AN/UYK-20, Computer AN/UYK-7, Digital Generating
Unit, Computer Univac 1640, Second Hard Copy Printer,
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Teletype Keyboard and Printer, plus various maintenance
equipment and spare parts.
b. Lines of Communication
(1) ASM and MC system identical to Station I
and shipboard telephone.
c. Tasks
(1) To generate computer inputs so that the
system operates properly.
(2) Maintenance area.
6. Fast Time Analyzer
a. Equipment
(1) Fast Time Analyzer Main Console
(2) Fast Time Analyzer
(3) Fast Time Analyzer Plotter
(4) Magnetic Tape Unit and Magnetic Tape
Controller
Plate (6) FTA Main Console and Analyzer
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Plate (7) Magnetic Tape Unit and Magnetic
Tape Controller
b. Lines of Communication
(1) Verbal communication only.
c. Tasks
(1) To display and analyze acoustic data received
from S-3 cassettes and/or other tapes and to accomplish this
in a real time or faster than real time, ie. an eight hour
mission replayed in one hour.
7 . Gram Analyzation
a. Equipment
(1) Four LOFAR gram units
Plate (8) LOFAR Gram Units
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b. Lines of Communication
(1) Verbal communication only.
c. Tasks
(1) To display and analyze acoustic data
received in real time from MCJR/MCDR relay.
(2) To display and analyze acoustic data





Plate (9) Teletype Printer
b. Lines of Communication




(1) Desk is used for displaying and assembling
information.
(2) Teletype printer is used to receive intelli-





Although the TSC at times works with different types of
aircraft in the air at the same time, each aircraft type has
its own mission profile. Thus, adjustments must be made to
handle this difference. Regardless of the particular air-
craft to be supported, the chain of command within the TSC











Plate (10) TSC Chain of Command
Even though TACCO I and TACCO II are considered sub-
ordinates to the watch officer, due to the similarity of the
station consoles, the TACCO' s may carry out all tasks given
to the watch officer with the exception of communication via
the MC circuits. This similar capability makes it often
impossible to determine whether the task is actually being
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accomplished by the watch officer or the TACCO. However,




During preflight the watch officer must insure that
all equipment is activated and functioning properly. Data
must be gathered from many areas of the ship and translated
into a format that the system finds acceptable. This data
includes such things as the carrier's own location, aircrew,
mission assignment, weapons loadout, sonobuoy loadout, etc.
All data must be entered on S-3 cassettes and distributed to
flight crews for insertion in their aircraft. Hard copies
of the briefing must be made and hand carried to the briefing
room. The briefing is then conducted by the briefing officer.
Plate (11) gives a link diagram.
2. Inflight
The S-3 aircraft is designed to operate entirely
without outside assistance during the inflight phase and is
assigned medium and long range distances from the carrier.
Radio communication between the S-3 and TSC must be maintained
so that as the situation alters, both the S-3 and TSC will be
advised of each change. The S-3 must notify the TSC of such
26

events as submarine detected, weapons launched, submarines
destroyed, etc. The TSC will use radio communication to
inform the S-3 of such things as change of area assigned to
it to be searched for submarines. Search areas for the S-3
change quite often due to intelligence reports and changes
in ship's operating plans, etc. Plate (12) gives a link
diagram.
3. Postflight
Upon return to the carrier, the S-3's cassettes and
tapes are immediately delivered to the TSC area by designated
members of the flight crew. While the debriefing officer is
personally debriefing the flight crew in the ready room, the
mission is being replayed in the TSC by utilizing the FTA and
LOFAR grams. A two hour mission may be replayed in fifteen
minutes. The mission is analyzed by TSC personnel and
critiqued with the flight crew while the grams are examined
for possible missed detections. Any information gathered is
utilized in mission planning for the next mission via
intelligence. Plate (13) gives a link diagram.
B . HELICOPTERS
1. Preflight
During preflight the watch officer must insure that
all equipment is activated and functioning properly. Data
27

must be gathered from many areas of the ship and translated
into a format that the system finds acceptable. The data in-
cludes such things as the carrier's own location, weather,
aircrew, mission assignment, weapon loadout, sonobuoy load-
out, etc. Hard copies of the briefing must be made and hand
carried to the briefing room. The briefing is then conducted
by the briefing officer. Plate (14) gives a link diagram.
2. Inflight
The helicopter is designed to operate at a close
range and must have outside assistance to perform its
mission. The helicopter must maintain radio communications
with the carrier for purposes of navigation control, tactical
control, and acoustic processing of sonobuoys . Since the
helicopter is incapable of processing its own acoustic data,
the CV-TSC must maintain constant radio communications with
the helicopter and have this information displayed on the
LOFAR grams of the TSC. Once a target is detected by the
LOFAR gram operator, notification of the detection must be
relayed to the aircrew via radio communication. Other sta-
tions located within the carrier must also be notified of
this detection. Plate (15) gives a link diagram.
3. Postflight
Upon return to the carrier, the members of the flight
crew are debriefed by the debriefing officer. Any useful
28

information gathered from the debriefing is entered into























Plate (11) Link Analysis of S-3 Preflight Phase. Width of





















M - MC only
W - MC and Telephone
A ASM
Q = Visual
R = Rad io
Plate (12) Link Analysis of S-3 Inflight Phase. Width of
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Plate (13) Link Analysis of S-3 Postflight Phase. Width of
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Plate (14) Link Analysis of Helicopter Preflight Phase.
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Plate (15) Link Analysis of Helicopter Inflight Phase.









































M » MC only
W = MC and Telephone
A = ASM
Q = Visual
R = Radi o
Plate (16) Link Analysis of Helicopter Postflight Phase.




A. PRESENT INSTALLATION DESIGN INADEQUACIES
1. Present Installation
Plate (17) shows the CV-TSC watch area as it now is
aboard the USS CONSTELLATION (CV-64)
.
2. Personnel Flow
References 15 and 16 concur that the space necessary
for a man to be able to traverse through an area is a minimum
of fifteen inches. A fifteen inch space requires the man to
turn sideways in order to pass through the area, but twenty-
two to twenty-four inches are preferred for easier access-
ability. The present installation does not have this
necessary space.
The space between the desk and various equipments is
as follows: TTY seven inches, hard copy printer seven inches
,
ASM with doors open zero inches, and watch officer station
six inches. Therefore, to operate the TTY or hard copy
printer correctly requires movement of the desk. Access to
the secure safe requires moving the desk away from the watch
officer station or from the TTY and hard copy printer. Per-
formance of maintenance on the magnetic tape controller/ASM



































Plate (17) USS CONSTELLATION (CV-64) TSC Installation
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access area to less than fifteen inches between the desk and
TACCO II. The desk is continually being moved with the re-
sult that it disturbs personnel working at the desk and
personnel at other stations.
The distance between the FTA plotter and magnetic
tape unit with the doors open is eleven inches
.
3. Communication Flow
References 9 and 14 suggest that controls, displays,
and stations which operate or monitor in conjunction should
be located together.
The system breaks down into several associated groups
that act in conjunction.
The associated groups are as follows: Group I con-
tains TACCO I, TACCO II, and watch officer station, Group II
contains FTA, FTA plotter, magnetic tape controller/ASM,
LOFAR grams, and magnetic tape unit, Group III contains the
desk, TTY, Group IV contains hard copy printer, and Group V
contains the secure storage area. These groups are based on
frequency and importance of communication between the various
stations
.
The normal operation for Group I is composed of the
watch officer station and one of the TACCO stations while
the second TACCO station is kept in reserve, ready for use
if there is a casualty in one of the other two stations. At
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the present time the three stations, instead of being grouped
together as a unit, are scattered so widely around the TSC
watch area that using them in the course of normal operations
is time consuming and inefficient. This leads to communica-
tions problems in the verbal and hand-carried areas.
In Group II, the magnetic tape controller/ASM is
located away from the rest of the group and requires per-
sonnel to walk through a high population area and also forces
interference with other stations to get to the area. From
the LOFAR grams and FTA areas it is impossible to tell if the
magnetic tape controller/ASM is operational. In order to
determine this, personnel must either walk back and forth
to the stations or shout back and forth to other personnel.
While operating controls on parts of the FTA, it is
impossible for the operator to receive visual feedback from
the LOFAR grams. Therefore two operators are required in-
stead of one, or one person must walk back and forth between
the areas if he wishes to see accurately what he is doing.
The secure storage area, which is utilized almost
entirely by the TSC watch officer or TACCO's, is located in
such a position that getting access to it requires moving
the desk and various personnel.
The entire installation's efficiency is significantly
reduced as personnel are constantly being forced to interfere
39

with other personnel in the course of carrying out their
duties
.
B. RECOMMENDED INSTALLATION DESIGN
1. Recommended Installation
Plate (18) shows the CV-TSC watch area aboard the
USS CONSTELLATION (CV-64) as recommended by this study util-




Reference 14 states "a study of the relative fre-
quency of interaction between components, makes it possible
to arrange equipment and operator positions to minimize the
amount of walking or reaching or the number of contacts be-
tween the operators for transmitting information. The
latter tends to reduce the probability of human error ."
The recommended design utilizes the close grouping concept
of Ref. 9 and 14.
Throughout all phases of the TSC operation, the watch
officer and the TACCO have a high frequency of interaction and
communication. Taking this high frequency of communication
into account, the watch officer station and TACCO II station
are located side by side. TACCO I station is located in
close proximity to the watch officer station in case need























Plate (18) Recommended Design for USS
CONSTELLATION (CV-64) TSC Installation
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maximum use of verbal communication between the station and
allows the ASM circuit to remain open for communications
from other areas of the ship. Rapid, efficient, and correct
processing of information is a must in ASW. If a submarine
is detected by the LOFAR gram operator, then the information
must be relayed quickly to the TACCO and watch officer, who
in turn must evaluate and relay this information to the heli-
copter for attack. If this process is not done quickly, in
a minimum of time, the submarine contact may be lost and the
opportunity to destroy the enemy is gone. Due to the high
interaction between the TACCO ' s and the watch officer, the
grouping of them together is a requirement to reduce human
error and improve efficiency in the system.
The analysis section of the TSC , made up of the LOFAR
grams, FTA, FTA plotter, magnetic tape unit, and magnetic tape
controller/ASM, have been grouped together for several reasons
One reason is the need for feedback to operators from
manipulation of controls. The magnetic tape unit's controls
and the feedback from the unit for operators is all located
on the front of the unit and there is adequate room in this
area for the personnel assigned to the station. When operat-
ing the MTC/ASM, several of the controls on its front panel,
control some of the functions of the FTA and the LOFAR grams.
Both the FTA and LOFAR grams can now be verified as operating
42

properly without leaving the operating controls located on
the front of the MTC/ASM. The FTA plotter remains in close
proximity to the FTA because the FTA controls the plotter
and provides operating personnel the immediate opportunity
to verify that the plotter is functioning properly. The
present design now has the FTA and LOFAR grams located in
such a position that the operator of the FTA cannot receive
immediate visual feedback from the LOFAR grams while oper-
ating the controls on the FTA. This frequent verification
of the frequencies displayed on the LOFAR gram and the FTA
can be easily accomplished without leaving the controls
located on the front of the FTA with the recommended design.
This close proximity and immediate feedback tend to reduce
human error and increase efficiency in the operation of the
CV-TSC.
A second reason for the grouping of the analysis
section is that the actual means necessary for the detection
of the submarine are located in one area. This enables the
watch officer and TACCO to expect to receive the critical
notification of a submarine detection from one general
location.
Therefore, the recommended installation not only
decreases the physical separation between the stations but
also lowers the frequency of communications required between
43

the stations. The recommended installation efficiently
organizes the communication flow into the basic flow re-
quired, that of detection, notification of detection to
higher command and to the attacking unit.
Traffic flow of personnel in the recommended design
will not only be reduced but that flow that is still required
will be much easier and safer.
The hard copy unit remains located near the door,
because the briefing officer is the one who utilizes it, by
making copies and delivering them to the briefing rooms.
Part of the controls of the hard copy printer are located
on the watch officer station, TACCO I, and TACCO II station.
With these three stations located near the hard copy printer
it reduces the movement required of the briefing officer in
the TSC to obtain a copy from the hard copy printer.
As previously mentioned in the area of communication
flow the recommended analysis area with its immediate feed-
back reduces the necessity for personnel to continually walk
back and forth from such units as the FTA, LOFAR grams, and
MTC/ASM. The nature of the watch officer station requires
contact with many areas and often times the communication
is done in person by personnel entering the TSC area. There-
fore, the recommended design has moved the watch officer
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station to close proximity with the door to reduce the traffic
flow throughout the rest of the TSC area.
Although traffic flow of personnel will be greatly
reduced in the recommended design due to the modular technique
of grouping, personnel will still find it necessary to move
around in the watch area to facilitate carrying out the
mission. Therefore, all traffic ways have been increased
to a minimum of fifteen inches with twenty-four inches
allowed for the major traveled areas. ZjL5 , 167
The widening of the traffic ways reduces interference
with personnel and will tend to reduce human error. However,
the most significant alteration of the recommended design
change is in the area of safety. During normal operation
and while performing maintenance and/or casualty repair,
equipment doors and modules are required to be open with the
inherent exposure of electrical circuits. The significant
decrease in personnel traffic flow, and the greater area
allowed for this necessary flow, significantly reduces the
probability of damage to exposed equipment, and/or injury or
accidental death to operating or maintenance personnel, as a
result of coming in contact with energized electrical circuits.
Overall the new installation design lends itself to
a lower level of human error and more efficient flow with
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